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Abstract This study investigated whether or not an increase in secondary science
teacher knowledge about evolution and the nature of science gained from com-
pleting a graduate-level evolution course was associated with greater preference for
the teaching of evolution in schools. Forty-four precertified secondary biology
teachers participated in a 14-week intervention designed to address documented
misconceptions identified by a precourse instrument. The course produced statisti-
cally significant gains in teacher knowledge of evolution and the nature of science
and a significant decrease in misconceptions about evolution and natural selection.
Nevertheless, teachers’ postcourse preference positions remained unchanged; the
majority of science teachers still preferred that antievolutionary ideas be taught in
school.
Keywords Evolution  Evolution education  Biology education 
Natural selection  Intelligent design  Creationism  Science teachers
Introduction
Despite the remarkable successes of evolutionary biology in the past century, and
the fundamental role of evolution in new scientific disciplines with direct ties to
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everyday life (e.g., evolutionary medicine, pharmacogenomics, and genomic
sciences), antievolutionism (creationism, creation ‘‘science’’, or intelligent design)
remains pervasive and widespread in the United States. Antievolutionary views are
commonly held by members of the general public (e.g., Brooks 2001; Newport
2006), high school students (e.g., Clough and Wood-Robinson 1985; Deadman and
Kelly 1978; Demastes et al. 1995; Stallings 1996), undergraduate students (e.g.,
Bishop and Anderson 1990), undergraduate biology majors (e.g., Dagher and
BouJaoude 1997; Grose and Simpson 1982), medical students (e.g., Brumby 1984),
and science teachers (e.g., Affanato 1986; Nehm and Sheppard 2004; Osif 1997;
Pankratius 1993; Tatina 1989; Zimmerman 1987). The problem of antievolutionism
is one of the greatest challenges for biology education because biologists consider
evolution to be the unifying concept of the discipline.
The maturing field of evolution education faces three core challenges: (a) to
understand the interrelationships among cognitive, affective, epistemological, and
religious variables that contribute to antievolutionary views in individuals of
different ages and educational backgrounds; (b) to design, implement, and evaluate
interventions that promote accurate cognitive models of evolution; and (c) to reduce
overall levels of antievolutionary attitudes (Alters 1997; Pigliucci 2002; Scott
2004).
In recent years, there has been a growing body of knowledge outlining the
diverse array of cognitive, affective, epistemological, religious and pedagogical
factors that contribute to an antievolutionary worldview (e.g., Alters and Nelson
2002; Bishop and Anderson 1990; Lawson and Worsnop 1992; Southerland and
Sinatra 2003; Southerland et al. 2001). Additional research has identified numerous
misconceptions about the nature of science and its relationship to antievolutionism
(National Academy of Sciences [NAS] 1998; Southerland and Sinatra 2003). This
research has advanced our understanding of the complexity of the challenges
that antievolutionism presents scientists and science educators. Unfortunately,
these studies have not yet been directly translated into research-based clinical
interventions.
Pedagogical and curricular strategies for addressing student and teacher
antievolutionism continue to be developed. These include inquiry instruction
(Alters and Nelson 2002; Demastes et al. 1995), paired-problem solving (Jensen and
Finley 1997), small-group discussion (Scharmann 1993), concept mapping (Trow-
bridge and Wandersee 1994), historically rich curricula (Jensen and Finley 1995),
modeling approaches (Passmore and Stewart 2002), explicit discussion of religious–
scientific boundaries (Gould 1999; Nehm and Sheppard 2004), explorations of the
nature of science (Dagher and BouJaoude 1997), technology-based visualization of
abstract evolutionary processes, and emphasis on formal reasoning and critical-
thinking skills (Lawson and Weser 1990; Lawson and Worsnop 1992).
Despite such innovations, the evolution education literature contains, remark-
ably, few empirical tests of these pedagogical interventions aimed at combating
antievolutionism (e.g., Jensen and Finley 1995, 1997; Scharmann and Harris 1992).
In general, those few interventions that have been evaluated have not produced
significant or long-term learning gains or behavioral changes (e.g., increased
emphasis on evolution in the curriculum). Additionally, nearly all intervention
700 J Sci Teacher Educ (2007) 18:699–723
123
studies have investigated samples obtained from less scientifically sophisticated
populations, primarily undergraduate nonscience majors (e.g., Bishop and Anderson
1990). Some groups, notably science teachers, are nearly absent from such work
(see, however, the important work by Scharmann and Harris 1992). The
effectiveness of the aforementioned pedagogical and curricular strategies on
science teachers’ understanding of evolution thus remains to be determined (Nehm
and Reilly 2007).
The rare intervention studies that have demonstrated success in reducing
antievolutionary ideas in science teachers have involved very small samples (< 20)
and were of limited duration (compressed immersion programs or brief modules),
thus limiting generalizability (e.g., Scharmann and Harris 1992). Most interventions
to date have produced meager gains in many aspects of participant knowledge of
evolution. Thus, the limited nature of existing studies precludes the resolution of
many fundamental questions, including whether or not significant learning gains
influence belief in—or acceptance of—evolution or the propensity to advocate for
the teaching of evolution in schools (e.g., Bishop and Anderson 1990; Demastes
et al. 1995; Jensen and Finley 1995, 1997; Scharmann and Harris 1992). In
summary, evolution education research is in urgent need of intervention studies that
employ sufficiently large teacher samples, offer treatments of reasonable duration,
and achieve significant learning gains.
Science Teacher Education and Antievolutionism
Science teachers are an important ‘‘missing link’’ between scientists’ understanding
of evolution and the general public’s ignorance of or resistance to the idea (Brooks
2001; Newport 2006). Science classrooms remain one of the few arenas in which
learning about evolution has the potential to take place. Science teacher educator
and scientist collaborations are, therefore, central to fostering the development of
teacher understanding of evolution. One obvious approach to fostering this link
between scientists and the public is to require, or at least offer, a college course in
evolution as part of all science teacher certification programs in biology (and
perhaps other sciences). Such a course could provide content knowledge on
evolution and the nature of science, employ conceptual-change strategies, address
well-documented misconceptions, and model pedagogical content knowledge
necessary for the teaching and learning of evolution (Gess-Newsome and Lederman
1999). These goals would also be aligned with the National Science Education
Standards (National Research Council 1995).
Those of us who have developed an evolution course as part of our biology
teacher certification programs, and therein have attempted to employ effective
pedagogical and curricular strategies to reduce antievolutionism in science
teachers, have struggled to answer a fundamental question that inevitably arises
during the development of such courses: What educational and social issues
should such an evolution course target? Scientists and science teacher educators
would undoubtedly agree that a fundamental goal of evolution instruction is to
increase teachers’ knowledge of evolution and the nature of science. But should
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that be the only goal? Should additional instructional goals of an evolution course
that addresses the previously cited problems also include achieving biology
teacher acceptance of (or belief in) evolution and teacher preference for the
teaching of evolution in schools? If acceptance and preference are learning goals,
how should they be implemented in the classroom? Surprisingly, the field of
evolution education is only beginning to address the curricular, pedagogical, and
ethical aspects of these theoretical questions. Therefore, the goals and methods of
evolution courses for teachers are based upon a foundation of empirical and
theoretical uncertainty.
Knowledge and belief underlie many fundamental research questions in science
education (Southerland et al. 2001), but there is little agreement about whether or
not both knowledge and belief are legitimate goals of evolution education or about
how to practically and meaningfully differentiate such distinctions in classroom
discourse. A burgeoning literature about knowledge and belief has thus far focused
on the theoretical, philosophical, and epistemological meanings of these concepts
and the justifications for advocating them as learning goals (e.g., Alters 1997; Chinn
and Samarapungavan 2001; Coburn 1994, 2004; Cooper 2001; Davson-Galle 2004;
Sinatra et al. 2003; Smith 1994; Smith and Siegel 2004; Southerland 2000;
Southerland and Sinatra 2003; Southerland et al. 2001).
The purpose of this study is not to review the numerous theoretical arguments
relating to knowledge and belief, but, rather, to contribute an empirical study of the
relationships between knowledge and belief in science teachers in the context of
their approach to teaching evolution. These theoretical issues must be resolved to
determine the appropriate goals and methods of evolution courses designed
specifically to meet the needs of science teachers. If the science education
community cannot agree about the learning goals of evolution education for
teachers, we must be prepared for continued confusion about this issue in teachers’
minds and in their classrooms.
Prior research on the relation between knowledge and belief in undergraduates
suggests that in some knowledge domains, such as photosynthesis and respiration,
knowledge and belief tend to be correlated. This relation does not appear to hold,
however, with regard to knowledge of and belief in evolution (Sinatra et al. 2003;
Southerland and Sinatra 2003). However, the connection between knowledge and
belief in the domain of evolution has yet to be studied in biology teachers. We might
anticipate a stronger connection between these variables in this case.
In addition to knowledge and belief, preference for the teaching of evolution is
another controversial issue in teacher education, but it too must be considered as a
potential goal of an evolution course for teachers. The major science education
organizations (e.g., the National Association of Biology Teachers 2004, and the
National Science Teachers Association 1997) unequivocally support teacher
understanding of evolution and also advocate for the teaching of evolution in
schools. Would a logical consequence of such statements be that teacher education
courses should foster science teacher preference for the teaching of evolution in
schools? Surprisingly, this issue has not been addressed in the evolution education
literature. As a first step in addressing this gap, the present study addresses these
issues empirically.
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Hypotheses
The overall goal of this study is to evaluate the impact of increasing science
teachers’ knowledge of evolution and the nature of science. Three specific
hypotheses are tested:
1. Completion of a 14-week evolution course (designed to address teachers’ initial
misconceptions of evolution and the nature of science) is associated with
significant increases in teacher knowledge of evolution and knowledge of the
nature of science;
2. Significant increases in teacher knowledge of evolution and the nature of
science are associated with increases in preference for the teaching of evolution
in schools; and
3. Significant increases in teacher knowledge of evolution and the nature of
science are associated with increased teacher preference that students believe in
or accept evolution.
Sample Participants
This study included 44 students enrolled in a graduate science teacher certification
program at a New York City college. Students were from a range of ethnic and
racial backgrounds. While the majority was of White non-Hispanic origin,
approximately 30% of the class was Latino or African Caribbean. The mean age
of the sample was 27.4 years. All students were in-service (or practicing) teachers,
and all were precertified (that is, they lacked permanent New York State teacher
certification credentials). The mean teaching experience for the sample was
1.6 years. The vast majority (95%) of teachers was enrolled in the biology
certification program, which requires previous college biology coursework prior to
acceptance. Ninety-five percent of the student teachers had bachelor degrees or
equivalent in the life sciences (BA, BS, or 30 credits of college biology). All of the
participants completed the course intervention.
Data Collection, Variables, and Methods of Analysis
Teachers in the sample voluntarily enrolled in a 14-week graduate biology course
that was part of their biology certification program. The course was not a program
requirement, and participation in the study was voluntary. On the first day of the
class, an instrument was administered to gather data on demographic variables (age,
religiosity, spirituality), certification goal (e.g., biology, chemistry), the extent to
which they were conflicted about the relationship between science and religion,
whether they had taken an evolution course previously, how many biology courses
they had completed, and whether or not they wanted students to be taught about
‘‘creationism’’ (defined broadly as biblical creation, intelligent design, or creation
science) in schools and whether or not they personally preferred students to believe
creationism.
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Teacher knowledge and attitudes about evolution and the nature of science were
assessed using a series of Likert-type items and essay questions. The Likert-type
instrument contained both positively and negatively phrased statements that were
ordered randomly. The modified essay questions about evolution were derived from
Bishop and Anderson (1990, p. 418).
In the interest of conserving space, an overview of the course curriculum and
pedagogy is provided in Table 1. The pretest knowledge results (Table 1, left
column) were used to structure the scope and sequence of the evolution course
(Table 1, middle column). Thus, the course attempted to engage teachers’ prior
knowledge of evolution and the nature of science. A variety of pedagogical
approaches (Table 1, right column) was implemented.
To match pre-and postcourse instruments, teachers were asked to choose a term,
phrase, number, or symbol that was not associated with their name or student
identification number that they would remember. Teachers were asked to write this
term on the precourse instrument and subsequently use it on their postcourse
instruments. All 88 pre-and postcourse instruments were matched while maintaining
participant confidentiality.
The reliability of responses was determined in two separate sections: the essay
section and the Likert-type scale section. Participant response scores on a positively
phrased Likert-type scale statement and on an equivalent negatively phrased Likert-
type scale statement were not, statistically, significantly different. In addition, the
two essay questions about natural selection (adapted from Bishop and Anderson
1990) using different taxa and selective contexts also produced numbers of
misconceptions that were not significantly different. Thus, it appeared that teachers
provided consistent answers to the survey questions. Eleven variables were
extracted from the instrument for analysis. Details on the variables, their coding,
reliability, validity, and methods of analysis are discussed below.
1. Conflict. Teachers were asked to self-report whether or not they were
conflicted about their scientific and religious beliefs by determining which of
the following statements best applied to them: (a) ‘‘Evolutionary ideas are at
odds or in conflict with my religious beliefs,’’ or (b) ‘‘Evolutionary ideas are
NOT at odds or in conflict with my religious beliefs.’’ The answers were
coded as binary scores. The McNemar test in SPSS (Version 9.0) was used to
determine if the distribution of Conflict scores changed significantly pre- and
postcourse.
2. Religiosity. Teachers were asked to self-report their religiosity by identifying
which of four statements about religion best applied to them: (a) ‘‘I am not
religious at all,’’ (b) ‘‘I am somewhat religious,’’ (c) ‘‘Religion is an important
part of my life,’’ or (d) ‘‘Religion is a very important part of my life.’’ The
answers were coded as ranked ordinal scores (1–4). An isomorphic question
about spirituality, scored in a similar manner, was positively and significantly
correlated with the religiosity scores; and, therefore, only religiosity was
analyzed. ENOS (see No. 8 below), ECK (see No. 9 below), teach (see No. 10
below), and belief (see No. 11 below), and were examined for significant
correlations with religiosity using Spearman’s rho in SPSS.
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3. Biosemesters. Teachers were asked to self-report how many semester-long or
quarter-long college biology courses they had completed. Quarter-long course
scores were converted to semester-long scores using the equation: 1
quarter = 2/3 semester. Spearman’s rho in SPSS was used to determine if
biosemesters was significantly correlated with ECK or ENOS (see Nos. 8 and
9 below) both pre-and postcourse.
4. Evocourse. Because the 44 participants had completed degrees or coursework
in biology previously, it was possible that an evolution course was part of their
Table 1 Overview of How the Pretest Results Were Used to Structure Course Content and the
Pedagogical Methods Used in Each Module
Selected pre-test knowledge results Corresponding course topics and lessons Pedagogical
methods*
Evolution is weak because it is a theory The Nature of Science
Theories become facts when they are
well-supported
(1) What is, and is not, science ACE, CL, R
Evolution can’t be observed so it is
outside realm of science
(2) Scientific and common meanings of the
terms theory, fact, law, and hypothesis
ACE, CL, R,
V
Evolution can’t be refuted by any
observation
(3) The commonalities between evolution
and other scientific theories
ACE, CL, R
Evolution can’t be ‘‘proven’’ (4) The role and significance of observation
in the scientific process
ACE, CL
Science and religion
17% conflicted about science and
religion
(1) Models of the relationship between
science and religion
ACE, CL, R
Majority advocate teaching some
antievolutionary ideas in school




Lamarckian ideas prevalent (1) The history of ideas in evolutionary
biology
L, R, V
Chance cannot be a factor in origin of
complex traits
(2) Sources of variation: mutation,
recombination, sex
L, CL, CM, R
No fossil species found between humans
and ‘‘apes’’




Mutations are harmful and cannot give
rise to new traits
(4) Molecular clocks and radiometric dating L, R, V
Humans and dinosaurs coexisted (5) Phylogenetic analysis using molecular
and morphological data
L, CM
Fossil record lacks intermediates (6) The fossil record ACE, F, L, R
*ACE = Alternative Conception Exposure
CL = Collaborative learning
CM = Concept Mapping
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studies. To determine if prior completion of an evolution course was
associated with patterns documented in this study, teachers were asked to
answer the following questions: ‘‘Have you taken college courses that have
discussed biological evolution (yes or no)?’’ and ‘‘Have you taken a college
course primarily in biological evolution (yes or no)?’’ All of participants
indicated that evolution had been discussed in their college courses and,
therefore, this variable was dropped from the analysis. Approximately 20% of
participants had completed an undergraduate-level evolution course. The
Mann-Whitney U test in SPSS was used to determine if evocourse was
associated with significantly different ENOS or ECK scores (see below) both
pre- and postcourse.
5. Key concepts of natural selection. Seven key concepts relating to natural
selection were identified (Anderson et al. 2002; Mayr 1982). The concepts
included (a) the causes of phenotypic variation (e.g., mutation, recombination,
sexual reproduction); (b) the heritability of phenotypic variation; (c) the
reproductive potential of individuals; (d) limited resources, carrying capacity,
or both; (e) competition or limited survival potential; (f) selective survival
based on heritable traits; and (g) a change in the distribution of individuals
with certain heritable traits. The presence or absence of these seven key
concepts was noted in the teachers’ essay responses to a slightly modified
version (our modifications are contained in parentheses below) of Bishop and
Anderson’s (1990) extensively used essay question: ‘‘Cave salamanders
(amphibian animals) are blind (they have eyes that are nonfunctional). How
would a biologist explain how blind cave salamanders evolved from ancestors
that had functional eyes and could see? Provide as detailed an answer as you
can’’ (p. 418). A coding rubric was developed, and teacher responses were
scored such that the use of a key concept in their explanation of evolutionary
change in salamanders counted as 1 point. Thus, an essay response that
employed all seven key concepts received 7 points. The essays were blindly
recoded by another scientist using the same rubric to examine interrater
reliability. Pearson correlation coefficients for key concepts between the two
raters were statistically significant (r = .89, p < .001). The Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test in SPSS was used to test for changes in the distribution of key
concepts in pre- and postcourse essays.
6. Concepts of natural selection. In addition to the number of key concepts,
biologically useful, accurate, but peripheral responses to the Bishop and
Anderson question were also noted and coded as additional concepts.
Examples of teacher responses that were scored as additional concepts
included the use of phylogenetic analysis to determine salamander ancestry,
the use of environmental change to explain selective forces, and the use of
homeotic mutations to explain the loss of eye function. These additional
concepts were deemed to be potentially useful for determining the teachers’
degree of conceptual sophistication in answering questions about evolution
and natural selection. A coding rubric was developed, and teacher responses
were scored such that the use of any accurate concept (other than a key
concept) in the explanation counted as 1 point. There was no limit to the
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possible concepts that could be employed in the essays. The Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test in SPSS was used to test for changes in the distribution of concepts
in pre- and postcourse essays.
7. Misconceptions about natural selection. A coding rubric containing commonly
documented misconceptions was developed (e.g., mutations are caused
primarily by mutagenic substances; needs cause evolutionary changes to take
place; the use or disuse of traits explains their appearance/disappearance; traits
appear only when they are needed; all individuals in a population develop new
traits simultaneously, and so forth [see Bishop and Anderson 1990]). Teacher
responses were scored such that the use of an identifiable misconception in the
evolutionary explanation counted as 1 point. There was no upper limit to the
number of misconceptions that could be employed by teachers in the essays.
The essays were blindly recoded by another scientist using the same rubric to
examine interrater reliability. The Pearson correlation coefficient for the two
raters’ scores for key concepts was statistically significant (r = 0.75, p = .008).
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test in SPSS was used to test for significant
changes in the number of misconceptions employed as explanations for
evolutionary change pre- and postcourse.
8. ENOS is a composite variable that was used to measure teacher knowledge
about the nature of science in relation to evolution (see Appendix). The
reliability of ENOS was first assessed in a pilot study of 78 teachers in 2002.
With 9 items, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.62. The reliability of ENOS was also
assessed using the 2004 sample of teachers. With the same 9 items, alpha was
.61. These are acceptable reliability values, considering the homogeneity of
the participants (Ary et al.2002, p. 261). The validity of ENOS was assessed
by examining the correlation of ENOS scores with a separately administered
essay that evaluated participant knowledge of the nature of science relating to
evolution. This essay examined participants’ abilities to (1) differentiate
scientific falsification from confirmation and determine the relation of these
ideas to the testing of evolutionary hypotheses (Popper 1959) and to (2)
employ these concepts by providing examples of how evolutionary hypotheses
could be tested. The allotted time was 30 minutes. Essays were coded, based
on the (a) number of accurate concepts and (b) number of empirical examples.
Coded essay scores for (a) and (b) were correlated with ENOS scores using
Spearman’s rho. ENOS scores were positively and significantly correlated
with the nature of science essay scores: (a) Spearman’s rho = .48, p = .038; (b)
Spearman’s rho = .61, p = .005. These results suggest that ENOS is a valid
measure of participant knowledge about the nature of science in relation to
evolution. ENOS was used to measure participant knowledge about the nature
of science pre- and postcourse.
9. ECK is also a composite variable, but was used to measure evolution content
knowledge (see Appendix). The reliability of ECK was first examined in a
2002 pilot study of 76 teachers. With 9 items, Cronbach’s alpha for ECK was
.72. The reliability of ECK was also assessed using the 2004 teacher sample.
With the same 9 items, alpha was .77. As was found with ENOS, these are
acceptable reliability values, considering the homogeneity of the participants
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(Ary et al. 2002, p. 261). The validity of ECK was assessed by examining the
correlation of ECK scores with a separately administered final exam essay that
asked participants to explain the processes (mechanisms) that cause patterns
of evolutionary change. Essay grades were converted to numerical scores and
correlated with ECK scores using Spearman’s rho in SPSS. ECK scores were
positively and significantly correlated with the final exam essay scores
(Spearman’s rho = .48, p = .033). These results suggest that ENOS is a valid
measure of participant knowledge about evolution. ECK was used to measure
participant evolution content knowledge pre- and postcourse.
10. Teach. The instrument assessed teacher preference for what students should
learn in school by using the following question: ‘‘Which of the following
would you prefer students to learn about in school? (a) Creationism (e.g.,
biblical creation, intelligent design, and/or creation science); (b) Evolution; (c)
Both creationism and evolution.’’ Answers were coded as ordinal scores (1, 2,
and 3). A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was used to determine if the distribution
of scores changed significantly pre- and postcourse using SPSS.
11. Believe. The instrument assessed teacher preference for student belief about
evolution using the following question: ‘‘Which of the following would you
personally prefer students to believe or accept? (a) Creationism (e.g., biblical
creation, intelligent design, and/or creation science); (b) Evolution; (c) Both
creationism and evolution.’’ Answers were coded as ordinal scores (1, 2, and
3). A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test was used to determine if the distribution of
scores changed significantly pre- and postcourse.
Results
Biology Teacher Misconceptions
The precourse instrument documented teacher misconceptions about evolution,
natural selection, and the nature of science that have also been shown to occur in
high school and college students (Table 2 and Figure 1). Commonly held
misconceptions about the nature of science included the ideas that ‘‘theories’’
become ‘‘facts’’ when they are well supported, that evolution can’t be ‘‘proven,’’
and that evolution is a weak scientific idea because it is a ‘‘theory.’’ Commonly held
misconceptions about evolution included the ideas that transitional intermediates are
missing from the fossil record, that mutations are harmful and could not have given
rise to new traits, and that humans and dinosaurs coexisted. Teacher misconceptions
regarding natural selection were numerous and included the ideas that the ‘‘use and
disuse’’ of traits explains their appearance, that traits appear when they are needed,
and that the environment causes evolutionary change.
Misconceptions about evolution and natural selection were frequently employed
as explanations (Figure 1A). The majority of teacher answers to the Bishop and
Anderson essay question, for example, contained misconceptions. Teachers in the
sample often held the same misconceptions. Specifically, more than 25% of teachers
employed ‘‘use and disuse: arguments or ‘‘need-based’’ explanations for evolution-
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Table 2 Teacher Misconceptions Documented in This Study and Their Distribution in Other Populations
Biology teacher
misconceptions:
Also documented in samples of:








(1987), Sinclair et al.
(1997)
Nehm and Sheppard (2004),
Eve and Dunn (1990),








be true it must
be observed
Evolution is weak











(1987), Sinclair et al.
(1997)
































Jensen and Finley (1995
1997), Sinclair and
Pendarvis (1997/1998),
Sinclair et al. (1997),
Nehm and Reilly (2007)
Jimenez (1992), Greene
(1990), Zuzovsky (1994)
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ary change (Figure 1A). A misconception that does not appear to have been reported
in the literature was frequently voiced by teachers in this study: Almost 25% of
teachers discussed the idea that the loss of salamander sight led directly to the
heightening of other senses that were then passed to subsequent generations.
Figure 1A also illustrates significant decreases in the frequencies of specific
misconceptions from precourse to postcourse. For example, ‘‘use and disuse’’
explanations, ‘‘need’’ as a cause of change, and simultaneous population change all
decreased significantly postcourse. The total number of misconceptions employed in
the teacher essays also decreased significantly postcourse (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test: n = 44, z = 4.28, p < .001). Specifically, 25 of 44 teachers used fewer
misconceptions in their explanations postcourse. However, 19 of 44 teachers did not
change (or, in two cases, teachers voiced one more misconception postcourse). In
summary, although overall misconceptions decreased significantly after taking the
course, they did not disappear, and many teachers continued to use the same
misconceptions that they brought to the course.
Biology Teacher Knowledge of Natural Selection
Figure 1B illustrates the key concepts of natural selection and their distributions in
pre- and postcourse teacher responses to the Bishop and Anderson question.
Teachers employed the key concepts of natural selection in low frequencies in both
the pre- and postcourse responses. Competition, limited resources, and overpro-
duction of offspring, for example, were employed in less than 25% of the teachers’
explanations of evolutionary change both pre- and postcourse. Heritable phenotypic
variation, selective survival, origin of variation, and changes in the distribution of
individuals with certain traits were employed in less than 50% of all precourse
responses. Teachers used some key concepts of natural selection markedly more
often than other key concepts. As shown in Figure 1A, reproductive potential was
invoked infrequently. By contrast, changes in the distribution of individuals with
certain traits were invoked much more often. Overall, teachers employed the ideas
of overproduction of offspring and competition in their explanations of evolution
the least (< 15%). However, there were statistically significant increases in the use
Table 2 continued
Biology teacher misconceptions: Also documented in samples of:





Traits appear only when they are needed
Populations develop new traits rather than individuals
When sight is lost other senses evolve to be more
sensitive
Mutations are caused by mutagenic substances in
environment
Change is caused by the environment
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of both individual key concepts (Figure 1B) and total key concepts postcourse
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: n = 44, z = 3.42, p = .001).
Biology Teacher Knowledge of Evolution and the Nature of Science
In addition to the Bishop and Anderson essay question, ECK scores were used to
measure changes in teacher knowledge of evolution. Pre- and postcourse
comparisons of ECK scores indicated that statistically significant increases occurred
0 10 20 30 40
Change in distribution of
individuals with traits












0 10 20 30 40
Use and disuse explanations
Need causes changes to take
place
Evolutionary hightening of other
senses
All individuals develop the trait
Environment causes change
Trait appearts only when
needed
Acquired trait inherited









Fig. 1 (A) Teacher misconception
frequencies pre- and postcourse. (B)
Teacher use of the components of
natural selection in their
explanations of an evolutionary
event pre-and postcourse
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(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: n = 42, z = 4.01, p < .001). Overall, 75% (31 of 42)
of teachers increased their ECK scores. The evolution course was also associated
with a positive and significant increase in teacher knowledge of the nature of
science, as measured by ENOS scores (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: n = 40,
z = 4.20, p < .001). Overall, 83% (33 of 40) of teachers increased their ENOS
scores postcourse.
Biology Teacher Preferences for Teaching Creationism
The precourse instrument revealed that 50% (n = 21) of biology teachers preferred
that students be taught some amount of creationism in schools, and the other 50% of
teachers preferred that students be taught evolution exclusively. A comparison of
teacher attitudes pre- and postcourse indicated no significant change in teacher
preferences for what students should be taught in schools (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test: n = 44, z = 1.16, p = .25). Thus, after completion of the 14-week evolution
course, approximately half of the teachers continued to prefer that students be taught
some amount of creationism in schools.
Biology Teacher Belief Preferences
The precourse instrument indicated that the majority (57%) of biology teachers
preferred that students ‘‘believe and/or accept’’ some amount of creationism.
Specifically, 9% of biology teachers preferred that students believe creationism
exclusively, 43% preferred that students believe evolution exclusively, and 48% of
biology teachers preferred that students believe both evolution and creationism.
A statistical comparison of teacher opinions pre- and postcourse indicated no
significant change in belief preferences (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test: n = 42,
z = 0.49, p = .62). However, 10 of 42 teachers did change their positions on what
students should believe: There were 32 ties, 6 negative ranks (moved to evolution
only), and 4 positive ranks (moved to both evolution and creationism). In summary,
after course completion, the majority of teachers continued to prefer that students
believe in creationism to some degree.
The Relationship of Knowledge Variables to Antievolutionary Teaching
Preferences
Teachers were grouped into two categories based upon their preferences for teaching
students antievolutionary ideas: Group 1 included those who preferred that students
be taught exclusively evolution in school, and Group 2 included those who preferred
that students be taught both creationism and evolution in school. No teachers in this
sample preferred that students be taught only creationism in school. This analysis
addressed the question: Do teachers who prefer that students be taught some amount
of creationism in schools have significantly different ENOS and ECK scores than
teachers who want students to learn only evolution in schools (Figure 2)?
A chi-square test indicated that Groups 1 and 2 (above) differed significantly in
both their precourse ENOS scores (chi-square = 4.637, 1 df, p = .031) and precourse
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ECK scores (chi-square = 10.35, 1 df, p = .001). Statistically significant results were
also found for postcourse ENOS and ECK scores. Mean values for ENOS and ECK
were greatest (i.e., most accurate) for the group of teachers who preferred that
students be taught evolution only (Group 1, precourse ENOS mean rank = 25.53,
Group 2 = 17.46; Group 1, postcourse ENOS mean rank = 28.60, Group 2 = 16.26).
Similar results were also found for ECK scores (Group 1, precourse ECK mean
rank = 28.58, Group 2 = 16.28; Group 1, postcourse ECK mean rank = 29.15, Group
2 = 15.78). Thus, teachers who preferred that students learn evolution only in schools
had significantly higher ENOS and ECK scores in both pre- and postcourse analyses.
Different results were found for misconceptions and key concepts, however. A
chi-square test indicated that Groups 1 and 2 (above) did not differ significantly in
either their precourse misconceptions scores (chi-square = 2.90, 1 df, p = .09) or
their precourse key concepts scores (chi-square = 3.6, 1 df, p = .06). No statistically
significant differences were found in postcourse misconceptions scores by group
(chi-square = 0.28, 1 df, p = .60) or key concepts scores by group (chi-square = 0.67,
1 df, p = .41).
Religiosity, Conflict, and Knowledge Variables
Analyses of the relationships between Religiosity and pre- and postcourse ENOS


















































































































Fig. 2 Teacher knowledge variables pre-and postcourse reported by teaching preferences (both evolution
and ‘‘creationism’’ or evolution only. N = 44. (A) Key Concepts of evolution scores. (B) Evolution in
relation to the Nature of Science scores. (C) Misconception scores. (D) Evolution Content Knowledge
scores. Error bars (1 standard error) are shown above each mean
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(Precourse: n = 41, Spearman’s rho = .31, p = .045; Postcourse: n = 43, r = 0.34,
p = .03). Similar results were found in analyses of Religiosity and pre- and
postcourse ECK scores (Precourse: n = 43, Spearman’s rho = .29, p = .06;
Postcourse: n = 43, r = .39, p = .010). Likewise, precourse misconception scores
and key concepts scores were significantly associated with Religiosity scores
(n = 44, Spearman’s rho = .31, p = .04; n = 43, r = .35, p = .02). Thus,
unsurprisingly, religiosity appears to have had an influence on precourse and
postcourse knowledge of evolution, natural selection, and the nature of science.
Interestingly, the course appears to have reduced the magnitude of self-reported
conflict between evolution and religion in participant teachers (McNemar test:
n = 44, 2 tailed test, p = .03; see Table 3).
The Effects of Previous Coursework
The prior academic preparation of biology teachers did not appear to be associated
with their knowledge of evolution, natural selection, or the nature of science as
measured here. There were no significant differences in misconceptions (pre- or
postcourse), key concepts (pre- or postcourse), ENOS (pre- or postcourse), or ECK
scores (pre- or postcourse; Table 4) by Evoclass (prior completion of an
undergraduate evolution class). Similarly, the number of college biology courses
(biosemesters) completed was not significantly correlated with misconceptions (pre-
or postcourse), key concepts (pre- or postcourse), ENOS (postcourse), or ECK
scores (pre- or postcourse; Table 4). Remarkably, the only significant correlation
between teachers’ total number of biology courses and the measured knowledge
variables was between biosemesters and precourse ENOS. Although difficult to
explain, a plausible account is that students who have come through a long series of
undergraduate biology courses often build up such a dense edifice of knowledge of
biological facts that they lose perspective on the architecture of first principles (M.
Cohen, personal communication, February 20, 2007).In summary, Religiosity was a
better predictor of measured knowledge variables (largely negative in the case of




Precourse ENOS 41 0.31 0.05
Postcourse ENOS 43 0.34 0.03
Precourse ECK 43 0.29 0.06
Postcourse ECK 43 0.39 0.01
Precourse Misconceptions 44 0.31 0.05
Postcourse Misconceptions 44 0.04 n.s.
Precourse Key Concepts 43 0.35 0.02
Postcourse Key Concepts 44 0.21 n.s.
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knowledge and positive in the case of misconceptions) than previous undergraduate
coursework in biology, evolution, or both.
Discussion
Significant core challenges for evolution education remain: (a) developing a better
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and belief, (b) testing
interventions designed to dissolve barriers to evolutionary understanding, and (c)
reducing overall levels of antievolutionism (Alters 1997; Pigliucci 2002; Scott
2004). This study explored the first two challenges by evaluating the impact of
knowledge induction in evolutionary biology on the teachers’ attitudes toward the
teaching of evolution. We demonstrated that one cannot assume that biology
teachers with extensive backgrounds in biology have an accurate working
knowledge of evolution, natural selection, or the nature of science. Considering
the centrality of evolution to biology, an evolution course should be a required
component of all biology teacher education programs. We investigated what effects
such a course would have on our biology teachers’ knowledge and beliefs in regard
to evolution and the nature of science.
The biology teachers who participated in this study had extensive background in
the biological sciences; 95% had bachelor’s degrees in biology or the equivalent.
Nevertheless, most teachers began the evolution course with diverse and abundant
misconceptions about evolution, natural selection, and the nature of science that are
also commonly held by high school students and college undergraduates. Only one
novel misconception was uncovered that does not appear to have been documented
previously.
The 14-week evolution course was associated with significant decreases in the
frequencies of specific misconceptions, such as ‘‘use and disuse’’ explanations,
‘‘need’’ as a cause of change, and simultaneous population change. Additionally, the
total number of misconceptions employed in the teacher essays also decreased
significantly postcourse. There were statistically significant increases in the use of
both individual key concepts of natural selection and total key concepts of natural
selection postcourse. Pre- and postcourse comparisons of evolution content
knowledge (ECK) scores indicated that statistically significant increases occurred.
The evolution course was also associated with a positive and significant increase in
teacher knowledge of the nature of science, as measured by Evolution in relation to
the nature of science (ENOS) scores. Thus, overall, the evolution course was
associated with statistically significant decreases in teacher misconceptions and
significant increases in teacher knowledge of natural selection, evolution, and the
nature of science.
Considerable research has focused on increasing science teacher understanding
of both evolution and the nature of science and decreasing science teacher
antievolutionism and resistance to teaching evolution in schools. Increasing teacher
knowledge of evolution and the nature of science has often been difficult to achieve;
thus, as a result, it has been difficult to determine the possible effects of increasing
knowledge about evolution and the nature of science on teacher preference for
716 J Sci Teacher Educ (2007) 18:699–723
123
teaching evolution. In summary, this study determined that statistically significant
increases in teacher knowledge about evolution and the nature of science did not
translate into greater preference for teaching evolution in schools. Indeed, we found
that the majority of New York City science teachers who participated in the course
still preferred after taking the course that (a) students be taught some amount of
creationism and (b) students believe, to some degree, in creationism (broadly
defined). Although 10 of 42 teachers did change their positions on what students
should believe, the majority of teachers continued to prefer that students believe
some amount of creationism.
One question that this study did not address is whether or not knowledge of
evolution could have a threshold effect on preference for teaching evolution; that is,
perhaps a certain level of understanding greater than what was achieved in this study
is necessary before preference levels change. Indeed, the teachers who participated
in the course began with low levels of scientific understanding (despite bachelor’s
degrees in biology). Despite significant learning gains (our mean pre-to-post effect
size was .79), perhaps the threshold of understanding necessary to alter preference
position was not reached. Further research should attempt to examine the effects of
overall knowledge level on preference position.
In Knowledge Domains Other than Evolution, Do Knowledge Gains Produce
Attitude Changes?
Research on the effect of knowledge on belief and attitude change has examined
diverse targets. Some of these include individuals infected with HIV (Slusher and
Anderson 1996), HIV prevention (Albarracin et al. 2003), the elderly (Angiullo
et al. 1996; Carmel et al. 1992), nuclear power plants (Showers and Shrigley 1995),
the death penalty (Wright et al. 1995), struggling learners (Nierstheimer et al. 2000),
addiction (Erickson et al. 2003), income tax (Eriksen and Fallan 1996), obese
individuals (Harris et al. 1991), and smoking (Koumi and Tsiantis 2001).
The results have been mixed but largely negative: A minority of studies suggests
that knowledge induction leads to significant but modest attitude and belief change
(e.g., Albarracin et al. 2003; Slusher and Anderson 1996). The meta-analysis
conducted by Albarracin et al., for example, indicated that knowledge inductions
about HIV transmission led to attitude change on some dimensions (e.g., the
perceived threat) but not in actual condom use. A number of problems undermine
Wright et al.’s (1995) finding that knowledge induction led to decreased acceptance
of the death penalty: The instructor of a college course on the death penalty was also
the chief investigator, raising the possibility of students changing their beliefs to
please the instructor; the psychometric properties of the measures were not
included; and data analyses were conducted on an item-by-item basis, rather than on
the basis of coherent scales. Although Nierstheimer et al. (2000) concluded that
increasing prospective teachers’ knowledge of struggling learners produced positive
attitude change, two problems call into question that conclusion: There was no
control group, and the methods for collecting data on the participants’ beliefs were
not made clear.
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In many studies, however, knowledge-oriented interventions have not changed
long-term attitudes and beliefs (Angiullo et al. 1996; Carmel et al. 1992; Erickson
et al. 2003; Harris et al. 1991; Koumi and Tsiantis 2001; Showers and Shrigley
1995). In a few studies, immediate postintervention attitude change occurred (e.g.,
Angiullo et al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2003; Koumi and Tsiantis 2001), but no
significant attitude differences were found between experimental and control groups
3–6 months after the intervention concluded.
In one of the most interesting and carefully controlled studies of attitude change
as a function of knowledge gain, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) compared a group
consisting of college students enrolled in a marketing course and a group of college
students enrolled in a tax law course. The two groups were equivalent in their initial
knowledge of tax law and attitudes toward taxation. The instructors involved were
not made aware of the purpose of the study. At the end of the semester, the learners
of tax law showed significant improvement on one attitude, belief in the fairness of
the progressive income tax system, concomitant to their gain in knowledge of tax
law. However, with regard to other important tax-related attitudes, for example,
attitudes toward one’s own tax ethics, others’ efforts at tax evasion, and other tax-
related crimes, the two groups were indistinguishable at the semester’s end.
The preponderance of these findings on knowledge gain and its relationship to
attitude and belief change is consistent with our finding that knowledge induction in
evolutionary biology did not induce attitude change toward the teaching of
evolution in schools. Our results are also consistent with the results of Sinatra et al.
(2003), who found no relation between knowledge of animal and human evolution
and its acceptance. It is probably too much to expect knowledge gain alone to
precipitate much change in beliefs and attitudes vis-à-vis the teaching of evolution.
The above studies that bear on knowledge domains other than evolution have a
number of implications for future research on inducing in biology teachers more
positive beliefs and attitudes toward the teaching of evolution. First, if possible, the
college instructors recruited for such research should not be aware of the
investigators’ hypotheses. Second, investigators should assess a variety of aspects
of attitudes and beliefs toward evolution, using richer psychometric instruments.
Third, in addition to measuring beliefs and attitudes regarding evolution and its
teaching, it is incumbent upon investigators to assess the actual occurrence of
evolution instruction among participating teachers in their classrooms. Fourth,
research on the induction of more positive beliefs and attitudes regarding evolution
should include both immediate and delayed posttests to assess the durability of
induced changes.
Is Belief Significantly Different from Acceptance?
The meanings of the terms belief and acceptance, at first glance, can be clearly
delineated, thereby eliminating potential semantic confusion in discussions
regarding the goals of evolution courses for science teachers. For example,
acceptance may be considered the recognition of a theory’s validity through rational
and systematic evaluation of evidence, whereas belief may be considered the
recognition of a theory’s validity using personal conviction, opinion, and
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extrarational criteria (Southerland and Sinatra 2003; Smith 1994). Unfortunately,
such solid distinctions dissolve in many research and classroom contexts because
research participants may be (a) unaware of the differences in the meanings of these
terms and (b) unlikely to recognize that their beliefs are irrational or not based on
evidence, thus rendering the distinctions between belief and acceptance meaningless
in self-reports. Indeed, it could be argued that few individuals are sufficiently
metacognitive such that they are cognizant of the epistemological foundations of
their beliefs. Is it possible for a researcher to rigorously determine how, in an
epistemological sense, an individual has arrived at his or her conclusion?
Finally, the distinction outlined above between belief and acceptance is perhaps
only useful within ‘‘scientistic,’’ ‘‘prescriptive,’’ or naı̈ve epistemological world-
views. In other words, it may be likely that practicing scientists believe in, rather
than accept, many scientific contexts. One could argue that belief is a central and
common descriptive reality in all scientific endeavors; no scientist has the
specialized knowledge and access to experimental apparatuses, data, or materials
to rationally and systematically determine the validity of most (if not all) scientific
ideas outside of his or her discipline. Therefore, it is likely that scientists believe,
rather than accept, much of their scientific knowledge, even though they would
undoubtedly prefer to view their scientific knowledge as acquired exclusively
through the systematic and rational evaluation of evidence. This problem calls into
question the utility of the tight distinctions made between acceptance and belief in
many teaching documents (e.g., NAS 1998; University of California Museum of
Paleontology 2004). Is the distinction between belief and acceptance relevant? (see
also Alters 1997).
This study tested very simple hypotheses of association between two major
variables (knowledge and level of preference), whereas we suspect that multiple
variables, with multiple interactions, are involved. Considerable research in
cognitive psychology and science education has indicated that the relationships
among understanding, acceptance, belief, knowledge, and preference are complex,
poorly understood, and controversial (Smith 1994; Southerland 2000). Indeed, many
factors, including cognitive dispositions, levels of reasoning, and personal
epistemologies, dispose the individual toward preference positions. It is likely that
knowledge is a necessary—but not sufficient—factor in reducing antievolutionism
in biology and other science teachers. Therefore, implementing evolution content
courses for biology teachers should not necessarily be assumed to be sufficient to
produce significant decreases in teacher belief in—or preference for—antievolu-
tionary standpoints.
Now we return to the question that was raised at the beginning of this paper:
What should be the goals of teacher evolution education courses? Are the goals of
such courses to achieve teacher understanding of evolution, acceptance of evolution,
belief in evolution, preference for teaching evolution, or some combination of
these? In an age of standards and performance-based education, it is, in many
contexts, mandatory to specify the goals of a course prior to instruction to assess the
success and quality of teacher education programs (as required by many
accreditation agencies, such as the National Council for the Accreditation of
Teacher Education). What should teacher educators list as the goals of their
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education courses, and what are appropriate foundations or justifications for such
goals? Scientists and science educators have much work to do, because the goals of
evolution education remain only superficially clear. For example, do we conclude
that the intervention executed in this study was ‘‘successful?’’ Teachers achieved
statistically significant gains in their knowledge of evolution and the nature of
science, but they continued to harbor antievolutionary worldviews. It will be
difficult to determine how to judge our science teacher education courses until the
goals of instruction are more explicitly delineated by the science teacher-education
community. In the meantime, we must begin to recognize that knowledge alone may
not be the primary solution to the problem of science teacher antievolutionary
beliefs—if, of course, belief is considered to be the problem that we need to address.
Appendix
Selected Likert-scale survey questions Variable
a. As evolution cannot be observed, it is outside the realm of science. ENOS
b. After scientists determine that theories are well supported, they refer to theories as facts. ENOS
c. Mutations are harmful and therefore cannot give rise to new characteristics. ECK
d. Evolution is weaker than many other scientific concepts because it is only a theory. ENOS
e. Fossil species have been found that are intermediate between humans and apes. ECK
f. The survival of early humans was difficult because of predatory dinosaurs. ECK
g. The organisms that cause malaria, gonorrhea, and tuberculosis have become resistant to
antibiotics. The biological cause of this resistance is evolution.
ECK
h. Radiometric dating of rocks indicates that the Earth is billions of years old. ECK
i. If evolution were true, ‘‘living fossils’’ like the horseshoe crab would not have stayed the
same for millions of years.
ECK
j. Evolution is not a testable scientific hypothesis because it cannot be refuted by any
observation.
ENOS
k. Chance cannot be a key factor in the origin of complex organisms. ECK
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